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programs result in lower emissions, a variable tax regime is preferable since first, it can ensure that the 
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Emissions Pricing Policies and Business Cycle: Fixed vs. Variable Tax 
Regimes 
Abstract 
As by-products, emissions follow economic fluctuations. Ignoring this fact in environmental 
policies can lead to unexpected emission fluctuations and increase the intervention costs. Using 
a real business cycle model, we compare two policies: a fixed tax policy where the price is 
constant over time, and a variable tax regime where the tax rate is set at the beginning of each 
period. We find that while both programs result in lower emissions, a variable tax regime is 
preferable since firstly, it can ensure that the maximum welfare is always achieved, and 
secondly, it is more effective in stabilising emissions.  
Keywords: emissions reduction policy, real business cycle, productivity shock, fixed emissions 
tax, variable emissions tax. 
 
1. Introduction and Background 
Although several global conventions have resulted in countries agreeing to control global 
warming via limiting greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, the debate on the appropriate policy 
to achieve environmental targets with the lowest economic costs still continues (among others, 
please see Simshauser and Doan, 2009; Stern et al., 2011; Ergas, 2012). In addition to the 
political reasons, it can be due to the fact that there are still uncertainties about the two-way 
relationship between economic activity and environmental quality. The current paper 
contributes to this debate by studying the relationship between macroeconomic fluctuations (in 
terms of business cycles) and emission variations. We investigate how environmental policies 
should be adapted to macroeconomic fluctuations to control emissions fluctuations.  
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Economic growth can be affected by global warming which in turn has a direct relationship 
with the atmospheric concentration of emissions. The emission concentration (or stock) has an 
extremely slow decay rate. This can raise the question of why do we need to consider variations 
in emissions if the mean level of emission stock does not change a lot? We can point to three 
reasons. First, global environmental pledges are defined in terms of limiting the flows of GHG 
emissions in a particular period. Following economic growth, the flows of emissions have a 
long-term growing trend and any variations along their long-term growing trend can increase 
the costs of intervention to achieve the commitments. Secondly, while the ultimate benefit of 
environmental policies is reducing damages from global warming and pollution (which is a 
long-term outcome), designing environmental policies which considers fluctuations caused by 
business cycles can bring cost saving benefits to those who bear the costs of such policies via 
smoothing the abatement path (Heutel, 2012). Thirdly, as a Pigovian tax, emission reduction 
policies intend to correct emissions externality by forcing polluters to pay for the externality 
of pollution they produce and motivating them to control their emissions. As the result of this 
paper shows, during business cycles (which can be controlled, but are inevitable), the impacts 
of macroeconomic fluctuations on the output and primary factor markets can be so significant 
that it can diverge producers’ attention from environmental activities and reduce the 
effectiveness of emissions price as a Pigovian tax. An environmental policy that considers 
business cycles and responds to them can increase the success of this motivating tool. Thus, 
while the ultimate goal of emissions reduction policies is stabilising atmospheric 
concentrations, policy makers should consider the variations in the flows of emissions and 
design policies that can control emissions fluctuations.  
This paper contributes to the theoretical debate on the environmental policy by analysing the 
macroeconomic transition effects of business cycles under alternative emissions pricing 
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regimes. We compare fixed and variable emissions pricing systems via the responses of 
different economic and environmental variables to real shocks. 
Literature on the emissions pricing comparison was first introduced by Weitzman (1974), who 
showed that uncertainty, in terms of asymmetric information about abatement cost, can result 
in a difference between a tax and a cap system. Subsequently, many researchers have focused 
on asymmetric information as the main source of uncertainty using partial equilibrium models 
(e.g. Newell and Pizer, 2003; Quirion, 2005; Fell et al., 2012) and general equilibrium models 
(e.g. Pizer, 2002; Dissou, 2005; Jotzo and Pezzey, 2007). Investigating the relationship 
between business cycles and environmental policies requires specifying uncertainty in terms 
of real shocks which cause real business cycles. Such study can be using a Dynamic Stochastic 
General Equilibrium (DSGE) model.  
DSGE modelling in environmental analysis was introduced by Fischer and Springborn (2011) 
and Heutel (2012) who both used Real Business Cycle (RBC) models1 where Total Factor 
Productivity (TFP) shocks cause economic fluctuation2. Hassler and Krusell (2012), also, 
introduced TFP shocks into a Regional Integrated model of Climate and the Economy (RICE) 
to provide an integrated investigation of climate policies on oil-producing and oil-importing 
countries. The environmental DSGE modelling literature has been extended to include other 
shocks such as environmental shocks (Angelopoulos et al., 2013), energy price shock (Roach, 
2014), consumption shocks (Argentiero et al., 2017) and nominal shocks (Annicchiarico and 
Di Dio, 2015). The contribution of the current paper to the literature is not introducing a new 
                                                 
1 An RBC model was first introduced by Kydland and Prescott (1982) and Long and Plosser (1983) to study 
business cycles. 
 
2 Few studies have analysed the interaction between business cycles and environmental policies during the 2000s. 
Focusing on investment in less pollutant technologies, Bouman et al. (2000) show that the best time to undertake 
environmental activities is during recessions. In a static model, Kelly (2005), also, investigates the relationship 
between emissions pricing policies and business cycles. 
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type of shock, but comparing the economic and environmental effects of two popular emissions 
reduction regimes of fixed and variable emissions taxes when a shock occurs.  
Previous studies mostly focus upon variable emissions taxes in which the tax rate is estimated 
via maximising social welfare in each period. For instance, in Heutel (2012) and Angelopoulos 
et al. (2013) the tax rate changes every period. Hassler and Krusell (2012) specified climate 
policies in terms of taxation on oil, Fischer and Springborn (2011) and Annicchiarico and Di 
Dio (2015) include variable tax, cap, and an intensity target, and Tumen et al. (2016) and 
Argentiero et al. (2017) consider taxes on fossil fuel and subsidy on renewable energy. A 
review of implemented tax policies in countries such as Finland, Norway, Switzerland and 
Japan (World Bank, 2016), however, indicates that the tax rate in their programs have been 
estimated and pre-announced a few periods (even years) in advance, and have been kept 
constant over several periods. Hence the volatility of tax rate is very limited, and is more fixed 
than variable. On the other hand, in a cap-and-trade system the price is determined by the 
market and can fluctuate3. These competing approaches motivate investigation of the dynamic 
macroeconomic effects of two emissions reduction regimes: first, a fixed tax system in which 
a constant tax rate is levied on each tonne of emissions; second, a variable emissions tax rate 
program in which the regulator observes all economic and environmental variables and chooses 
a tax rate which maximises social welfare in each period.  
In this study an RBC model is developed and parameterised using data for the Australian 
economy. Australia’s emissions reduction programs have changed several times due to 
inconsistent political support. The former emissions pricing program, which operated from 
2012 to 2014, included a fixed tax and an emissions trading scheme (Australian Government, 
2011). Although neither system is now in operation in Australia, the results from this research 
                                                 
3 Theoretically, in the perfect information situation, the tax rate will be set at the market price of a cap-and-trade 
system and thus, both regimes will result in the same economic and environment outputs. 
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are pertinent in showing how economic outcomes differ under these alternative policies during 
similar business cycles, should their reintroduction in the future be considered. 
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 explains the model and parametrisation method. 
The simulation results will be shown in Section 3. Section 4 presents the conclusions. 
2. Model  
We adopt the model developed by Heutel (2012), which consists of a single producer and a 
single consumer4. The producer uses capital as the only production factor to produce final 
goods and services and the consumer derives utility from consumption of final goods u(ct). 
Like many other emissions reduction policy analyses (such as Kelly, 2005; Heutel, 2012; 
Angelopoulos et al., 2013), labour is not included for simplicity since employment fluctuation 
is not the interest of this study. As an RBC model, output at each period yt can be affected by 
stochastic TFP at. Emissions mt is a by-product which decreases by abatement μt. The stock of 
emissions, or pollution xt, imposes damages to output. The profit maximising producer 
considers the costs of production and abatement and optimises the amount spent on capital and 
abatement. Figure 1 schematically displays the economic and environmental relationships of 
the model. 
Under a Business as Usual (BAU) scenario, the government does not interfere and there is no 
price on emissions. Hence, the producer does not internalise the effects of emissions it produces 
and refuses any abatement, i.e. μt = 0. 
Under a fixed tax policy, the government levies a fixed tax rate p* on each tonne of emissions 
the firm produces. The government is neutral which means that it collects the tax and returns 
                                                 
4 The model is presented in details in Appendix 1. 
6 
 
the tax revenue to the household in lump sum transfers5. The tax motivates the producer to 
decrease emissions by choosing the optimal path of abatement which maximises its profit. 
Under a variable tax regime, the government observes the firm’s and household’s optimization 
behaviour and chooses an optimal tax path {pt} which maximises social welfare in terms of 
total discounted expected utility. The first order conditions (presented by Equations A22-A25 
in Appendix 1), show an advantage of the variable tax system as the government can increase 
the tax rate when the marginal value of consumption (which can be interpreted as the marginal 
cost of investment) is lower. In other words, the variable tax rate can be adjusted to the welfare 
changes (in terms of the utility from consumption) to ensure that the maximum of social welfare 
is obtained. 
The model under BAU, fixed and variable emissions tax scenarios include non-linear equations 
which make the model too complicated to enable a structural solution. Instead, a numerical 
solution can be found through calibrating the model. Calibration is a standard parameterisation 
approach used in DSGE modelling since Kydland and Prescott (1982). To this end, we first 
specify the general relationships of the model, such as the utility function, and then we use the 
literature to calibrate the parameters. For environmental relationships and parameters, we 
utilised the Dynamic Integrated Climate-Economy (DICE) model (Nordhaus, 2008) and the 
RICE model (Nordhaus, 2010). For economic parameters, we use available Australian RBC 
(such as Rees, 2013, Gomez-Gonzalez and Rees 2013, Jaaskela and Nimark, 2011, and Hodge 
et al. 2008). Appendix 2 presents calibration in details. 
 
                                                 
5 This simplifying assumption is conventional here since the aim of this study is to analyse the performance of 
emissions reduction policies and not to investigate the revenue allocations polices. 
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3. Simulation Results  
We simulate the calibrated model in order to answer two types of questions: first, how do the 
economic and environmental variables (including the variable tax rate and abatement) respond 
to a real shock? Secondly, which emissions tax system could control economic and 
environmental volatilities better6? To this end, we analyse the impulse response functions 
(IFRs) of the key macroeconomic and environmental variables to shocks and present the 
theoretical moments generated by the model for different policy regimes. We find the 
numerical solution for policy analysis by coding the model into Matlab. The BAU results are 
used as the benchmark case with which to compare the effects of different emissions pricing 
policies. 
We start with finding the fixed tax rate. To this end, we calculate the variable tax steady state 
solutions including the steady state of the emissions tax. The steady state of a variable v  is the 
value that does not change over time, i.e. 1tt vv += . The steady state tax rate (where the stochastic 
variable at is equal to the expected value of 1) maximises social welfare constrained to the 
behaviour of consumers and firms. Thus, the tax rate includes all benefits and costs that it 
would have for all sectors (with full information) in the economy under a steady state situation. 
This calculated tax is then used as a constant tax rate in a fixed tax regime. This approach can 
help us to conduct a comparison between the two pricing regimes since it excludes any possible 
economic and/or environmental effects of a higher or lower tax rate and, instead, just shows 
the effects of a pegged versus flexible tax policy.  
                                                 
6 A variance decomposition could be also used to answer the second question. 
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In order to obtain the IRFs, we log-linearize the model around the steady state values7. The 
log-linearized model is a good approximation of the model which facilitates showing small 
fluctuations around steady state caused by a shock. To solve the log-linearized model we use 
the Anderson-Moore Algorithm (AMA)8 which is a method for solving complex problems 
including perfect-foresight models with asymptotic constraints on non-linear models, which 
are the main features of our model. The solution matrix9 (provided in Appendix 3) presents the 
dynamics of the model. These relationships can be shown graphically via two approaches: first, 
IRFs which are the response path of the variables over a period of time when a shock happens 
in the first period; second, via simulating business cycles in the economy by introducing a 
series of TFP shocks over a period of time and analysing the responses of variables to those 
shocks.  
Figure 2 displays the response path of economic variables of capital, output and consumption 
to a one-time, transitory shock to TFP under both emissions reduction policies. The response 
path of four environmental variables including abatement, emissions, abatement costs and 
variable tax rate to the same shock are presented by Figure 3. The shock occurs exogenously 
in period one at the size of one standard deviation (as explained in the calibration section in 
Appendix 2, the standard deviation is 0.0069, and the decay rate is 0.98). The path of TFP is 
exogenous since the innovation shock occurs exogenously. The simulation is run for 200 
periods, equal to 50 years.  
As Figure 2 shows, the positive shock results in a positive deviation of economic variables 
from their initial steady states. The responses of economic variables to the shock are very 
                                                 
7 The log-linearization method is broadly applied in the DSGE literature (such as Tabellini, 2005; Fischer and 
Springborn, 2011; Heutel, 2012) in which the model is linearized in the neighbourhood of the non-stochastic 
steady state of variables.  
8 AMA was developed at the Federal Reserve Board by (Anderson and Moore, 1985) and evaluated by Anderson 
(2010) as an accurate method.  
9 The solution method is explained in details by Zagaglia (2005). 
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similar under both emissions tax scenarios and are pro-cyclical. The shock happens, as shown 
on the top left, in the first period and increases capital productivity which then results in higher 
output at the same level of input. The peak of output happens in the first period. The increase 
of capital productivity motivates the firm to increase the demand for capital. However, the peak 
of capital does not occur in the first period since TFP is a flow variable while capital is a stock 
and it takes more time, about 45 periods equal to 11 years, to reach its peak. Consumption, 
also, increases as it is a function of output and capital. The dynamics of the consumption 
response, however, is affected by the path of capital and it peaks at around period 30 which is 
equivalent to year 7. 
The responses of the environmental variables are different. As Figure 3 shows, the IRFs of 
abatement and abatement costs are counter-cyclical under a fixed tax policy. This is due to the 
fact that under a fixed emissions tax scenario the increase in capital productivity implies that 
spending on abatement is more costly than before the shock, though the tax rate has not been 
changed. Thus, the profit maximising firm would rather to spend more on capital, less on 
abatement. The key equation governing a firm’s abatement choice is shown in Equation A14 




yh'g =µ , governing a firm’s abatement choice where 
μ, y and p represent abatement, output and carbon price, respectively. The left hand side of the 
equation shows the marginal cost of abatement. The right-hand side shows the marginal cost 
of producing emissions. An increase in productivity raises consumption, which with a fixed 
tax lowers the marginal cost of pollution for firms. If pollution is less costly, firms will spend 
less to avoid polluting. Hence, spending on abatement declines10.  
                                                 
10 As Appendix 2 also shows, the relationship between abatement and output is negative since 1-γ, θ1 and θ2 are 
all positive.  
10 
 
Under a variable tax scenario the firm’s choice of abatement is affected by not only output but 
also by the emissions tax. Like the fixed tax rate case, the relationship between abatement and 
output is negative while the abatement and tax relationship is positive. To investigate how a 
variable tax rate would react when a productivity shock occurs, the IRF for the tax rate is 
simulated. The results show that the response path of tax rate is pro-cyclical. The tax rate 
follows the consumption path since the tax is a function of current and expected future 
consumption and peaks in period 30, year 7. Therefore, an increase in TFP leads to an increase 
in output and tax. The tax increase motivates the firm to decrease emissions by increasing 
abatement while the increase in productivity signals the firm to allocate resources to production 
rather than abatement. Hence, analytically, the change in abatement is ambiguous. However, 
the simulation result depicts that the output stimulus is more significant as soon as the shock 
occurs and the abatement drops lower than its steady state. As time passes the motivation of 
tax dominates and the firm increases abatement to even higher than its steady state and it peaks 
in period 60, year 15. Being affected by the increase in output and the tax rate, the abatement 
costs response path also increases and follows the tax path peaks in period 30, year 7.  
Despite the differences in abatement the output response to the TFP shock follows the same 
direction under each tax policy and the differences in output is so small that it seems the output 
IRF overlaps under both regimes, although it does not11. This implies that abatement cost is a 
very small fraction of total output and that the differences in abatement under the different 
programs does not have a noticeable effect on total output. Therefore, output increases under 
both regimes while abatement costs decrease under the fixed emissions tax but increase under 
the variable emissions tax scenario. The simulation results also reveal that emissions increase 
under both scenarios. This finding points to the important role of output in emissions. 
                                                 
11 The solution matrix presented in Appendix 2 shows the difference between the IRFs. 
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Influenced by abatement, however, emissions increase to a lower level in the variable tax 
program (0.07% deviation from steady state) compared to the fixed emissions tax policy 
(0.09%).  
We acknowledge that he quantitative differences between the fixed and variable tax policy in 
this paper are small and a more sophisticated model, or adding other types of shocks might find 
larger responses. However, we can conclude that in the presence of a positive TFP shock a 
fixed emissions tax system loses its motivation as the firm only increases production regardless 
of its environmental consequences, while a variable tax program can significantly provide 
environmental incentives for the firm to make abatement efforts besides increasing production. 
This is due to the fact that under a fixed tax regime the marginal cost of emissions remains 
unchanged thus the firm can increase pollution at the same cost, while in a variable tax system 
a positive TFP shock increases the marginal cost of emissions, i.e. the tax rate, which persuades 
the firm to decrease emissions.  
We now analyse the case of a real business cycle where a series of exogenous TFP shocks 
occur that produce business cycles, where output expands and contracts. Figure 4 shows the 
simulation time paths of output to a series of TFP shocks. The simulation results include an 
assumed boom from period 20 to 50 followed by a recession from period 50 to 80. The levels 
are normalised to the BAU steady state level of output in order to facilitate comparison. As the 
figure displays, both emissions tax policies impose economic costs in term of output as the 
steady state of output under both tax scenarios is lower than under BAU. However, being 
strongly affected by TFP, the path of output fluctuation is similar under the three scenarios. 
This finding is in line with the IRF of output presented in Figure 2 in which the difference 
between response paths of output under the two regimes was negligible.  
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Figure 5 shows the cyclical simulation results of emissions. Again, the levels are normalised 
using the BAU steady state level of emissions. Three findings can be observed in this figure. 
First, the emissions path follows output under all scenarios since emissions are a by-product of 
production. Second, both tax regimes are effective in controlling emission production as both 
result in lower levels of emissions than the BAU. Third, the path of emissions under the variable 
tax regime fluctuates more than under BAU. To make the fluctuations easy to observe the 
emissions paths in terms of deviation (and not the level) from steady state values of emissions 
are also shown in Figure 5 (the right side). As the figure shows the deviation from steady state 
of emission under the fixed tax regime is greater, which implies that the cyclical path of 
emissions fluctuates more for the fixed tax regime than the variable tax regime. This is due to 
the fact that under a fixed tax system the marginal cost of producing emissions remains 
unchanged and the firm would not be motivated for abatement. In a variable tax regime, 
however, the change in the tax rate, or the cost of producing emissions motivates the firm to 
decrease such costs through abatement efforts. 
3.1.Theoretical Moments 
Given the persistence of the shocks and in order to better understand the dynamic behaviour of 
the system under different emission pricing regimes we compute the theoretical moments of 
the main macroeconomic and environmental variables over the lifetime of the shock by 
calculating the average values of these quantities over 1000 periods. 
 Table 1 reports the results including the theoretical means, standard deviation, and the standard 
deviation in relative terms with respect to output. This can be interpreted as a measure of 
relative volatility. Comparing the results indicate that the macroeconomic behaviour of both 
fixed and variable emissions pricing systems are very similar as the difference between the 
expected level and volatility of economic variables are negligible. However, the variable tax 
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system results in higher expected abatement and lower expected emissions. It also leads to 
lower environmental volatility since the standard deviation and relative standard deviation of 
abatement and emissions are lower in the variable tax regime case.        
Thus, although both types of emission pricing policies can result in lower emissions, the 
unexpected variation in emissions is higher in the fixed tax system which can increase the risk 
of failure in meeting the emissions control commitments during the boom period. Hence, as 
policy makers are interested in monetary and fiscal policies which can stabilise economic 
growth and reduce economic fluctuations, they should design environmental policies which 
eliminate the unexpected variation of emissions caused by business cycles. As the results of 
this paper showed, the variable tax policy (particularly if the tax can be adjusted rapidly to 
changes in the marginal value of consumption) can ensure that the maximum social welfare is 
achieved, but also is more effective in controlling emissions fluctuations and can help the 
government to follow a consistent environmental policy.  
4. Conclusion  
In this paper, we investigated the relationship between business cycles and emissions and 
compared two emissions pricing systems of fixed and variable during boom and recession 
periods. We discussed that ignoring the correlation between economic fluctuations and 
emissions and only focusing on deterministic situations may increase the risk of encountering 
undesired changes in emissions when business cycles happen and increase the cost of 
intervention. Thus, while policy makers apply different fiscal and monetary tools to reduce 
macroeconomic fluctuations and stabilise economic growth, they should take an effective 
environmental policy which control emissions fluctuations. We used an RBC model. RBC 
models have been recently introduced to the environmental policy analysis and this paper 
contributed to the literature by comparing a fixed and a variable tax system in an RBC 
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framework. The first advantage of a variable tax regime shown by the model is that the variable 
emission tax rate will be modified to any changes in the marginal value of consumption (or the 
marginal cost of investment) to ensure the optimal welfare is gained. Pegging the emissions 
tax can maximise welfare under steady state condition, however, it cannot lead to maximum 
social welfare if the marginal value of consumption change. Calibrating the model for the 
Australian economy, we found that a variable tax regime should be set to be pro-cyclical to 
business cycles so as to be able to provide motivation for firms to make abatement efforts, 
while a fixed tax system loses its motivation. The simulation results also indicate that a variable 
tax program results in lower emissions fluctuations during business cycles and therefore, is 
more effective in stabilising emissions.  
Future study can tailor the model to a small open economy, which is most suited for the 
Australian economy. Additionally, while the focus of this study was on the emissions pricing 
regime comparison when business cycles caused by transitory productivity shocks happen, the 
extension of this research to other shocks can open more scope for fixed and variable tax 
regimes. This can include other types of transitory shocks (such as transitory environmental or 
political shocks) or permanent shocks being observed with noise, as in Rees 2013.  
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Appendix 1: The Model 
This section provides the details of the model. The main structure of the model is outlined in 
Sections 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3 followed by the specified emissions reduction policies highlighted in 
Section 1.4.  
1.1. Environment 
The emissions aggregate in the atmosphere is shown by the pollution stock xt which imposes 
negative effects on the economy in terms of damages d(xt). ( ) 10 ≤≤ txd  represents the loss of 
potential output supply due to pollution and is an increasing function of output. A proportion 
of the pollution stock is assumed to be absorbed naturally by jungles and oceans and decays at 
the rate of 1-η. The pollution stock is a function of domestic emissions mt and emissions from 
the rest of the world rowtm : rowtt1tt mmxx ++= −η . Emissions arise from production yt: 
( ) ( )ttt yh1m µ−=  where h shows the relationship of emissions with output for given 
technology, maintaining constant abatement. 10 ≤≤ tµ  is abatement or the fraction of 
emissions abated in period t and is determined by ( ) ttt y/zg =µ . g(μt) is the marginal abatement 
cost which is proportional to output. This implies that total abatement spending zt is equal to 
the marginal abatement cost multiplied by total output: ( ) ttt ygz µ= .  
1.2. Production Sector 
There is a representative agent who produces a commodity using capital from the previous 
period kt-1. The production function is ( )( ) ( )11  t t t ty d x a f k −= − . at is TFP and the source of 
economic fluctuations with an expected value of 1 and evolves according to a stationary, first 
order autoregressive process: t1tt alnaln ερ += − . ρ is the persistence parameter and εt is an 
i.i.d. normal random variable, known as the innovation shock to productivity, with a mean of 
zero and standard deviation σ. The shock may occur only once each period and is observed by 
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agents. The firm maximises profit by choosing the appropriate level of abatement and capital. 
The profit function is given by: t1tttt zkry −−= −π  where πt is profit and rt is the rate of return 
on capital. The externality from pollution arises as the firm does not consider the effects of 
emissions it produces although it receives damage from the stock of pollution. This assumption 
is plausible in a competitive market in which there are many identical small firms which ignore 
the impact of emissions they produces on the entire stock of pollution (and thus, on damages) 
and take the stock of pollution as given.  
1.3. Consumption Sector 
The economy is inhabited by rational identical households who derive utility from the 
consumption of goods and services u(ct). The household observes at at the beginning of each 
period and expects future values of at+1 and maximises expected total discounted utility: 
( )∑∞=0t ttt cuE β . The operator Et is the expectation of future values of at+1 at period t and β is 
the discount factor. The household is the owner of the firm and receives profit and rate of return 
on capital, and chooses between consumption ct and investment it. The capital stock depreciates 
at the rate of δ: ( ) 11  t t tk k iδ −= − +  and the budget constraint is 1 .t t t t tr k c iπ −+ = +  
1.4. Emissions Reduction Scenarios 
We specify three scenarios including business-as-usual (BAU), fixed emissions tax and 
variable emissions tax. Under a BAU scenario the government does not interfere and, thus, 
there is no price on emissions. Without any policy the profit maximising firm sets the costs of 
abatement equal to zero, zt=0, by refusing any abatement activities, μt=0, hence, it does not 
internalise the effects of emissions it produces. Optimising the profit over capital, the marginal 
value product of capital is set equal to the rate of return: ( ) ( )1t1ttt kf/k'fyr −−= . On the other 
hand, the consumer chooses between consumption and investment by maximising expected 
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discounted utility which results in the Euler equation ( ) ( ) ( )1 1'   ' 1 0t t t tu c E u c rβ δ+ +− + + − =   . 
The household’s optimisation behaviour results in the same Euler equation under other 
scenarios. Using these equations we display the economy under a BAU scenario as: 
 ( ) ( )1t1ttt kf/k'fyr −−=  (A1) 
 ( )tt yhm =  (A2) 
 tt1ttt ickr +=+ −π  (A3) 
 1tttt kry −−=π  (A4) 
 ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] 01rc'uEc'u 1t1ttt =−++− ++ δβ  (A5) 
 rowtt1tt mmxx ++= −η  (A6) 
  ( )( ) )k(faxd1y 1tttt −−=  (A7) 
 ( ) t1tt ik1k +−= −δ  (A8) 
 t1tt alnaln ερ += −  (A9) 
Under a fixed tax policy the government levies a constant rate p* on each tonne of emissions 
the firm produces. The government is neutral which means that it collects the tax and returns 
the tax revenue to the household in lump sum transfers. Therefore, the household’s budget 
constraint is: 
 ttt1ttt icmpkr +=++ ∗−π  (A10) 
The tax motivates the firm to decrease emissions by decreasing production or making 
abatement efforts, as shown by equation (A11). Equation (A12) shows the abatement costs.  
 ( ) ( )ttt yh1m µ−=  (A11) 
 ( ) ttt ygz µ=  (A12) 
Considering the tax and abatement costs, the producer’s resource constraint is: 
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 tt*1tttt zmpkry −−−= −π  (A13) 
The firm chooses the optimal path of abatement {μt} which maximises its profit, equation 
(A13), subject to equations (A7), (A11) and (A12). The first order condition (FOC) with respect 





µ = . Additionally, optimising profit over capital leads to
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]ttt*1t1ttt gyh1p1kf/k'fyr µµ −′−−= −− . Therefore, the system of equations 
describing the economy in a fixed emissions tax regime are equations (A5) to (A13) and  




yh'g =µ  (A14) 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]ttt*1t1ttt gyh1p1kf/k'fyr µµ −′−−= −−  (A15) 
The optimising output of a firm in a variable tax regime is the same as that for a fixed tax 
system while the tax rate pt changes over time. So equations (A10), (A13), (A14) and (A15) 
can be written as: 
 ttttttt icmpkr +=++ −1π  (A16) 
 ttttttt zmpkry −−−= −1π  (A17) 




yh'g =µ  (A18) 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]tttt1t1ttt gyh1p1kf/k'fyr µµ −′−−= −−  (A19) 
The regulator observes the firm’s and household’s optimization behaviour and chooses an 
optimal tax path {pt} which maximises social welfare in terms of total discounted expected 
utility. The regulator’s optimisation problem is 




subject to the firm’s and household’s FOCs and budget constraints, equations (A5), (A16) to 
(A19), and other environmental and economic relationships, equations (A6) to (A9), (A11) and 
(A12). This optimisation problem can be simplified to the following Lagrangian equation: 
 ( )( ) ( )( )
( )( ) ( )( )


























where λt, ωt, ςt are the Lagrangian multipliers. To reduce clutter, the simplification steps are 
supressed here. Also, the expectation operator is dropped, yet for a variable in period t+1, the 
expected value of that variable is considered. Optimising the Lagrangian equation over the tax 
leads to the FOC with respect to pt: 
( ) ( ){ }












In order to solve such a Ramsay model the regulator optimises social welfare over kt, yt and xt 
as below: 
−𝑢𝑢′(𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡) + 𝛽𝛽𝑢𝑢′(𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡+1)(1− 𝛿𝛿) + 𝛽𝛽𝜆𝜆𝑡𝑡+1{−𝑢𝑢"(𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡+1)(1 − 𝛿𝛿)} 




�1 − 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡(1− 𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡)ℎ′(𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡) − 𝑔𝑔(𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡)� + 1 − 𝛿𝛿�� 
−𝛽𝛽𝜔𝜔𝑡𝑡+1[1 − 𝑑𝑑(𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡+1)]𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡+1𝑓𝑓′(𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡) = 0 
(A23) 
( ) ( ) ( ){ }












 ( ) 0)('11 =+− −+ tttttt xdkfaωηβςς   (A25) 
Equation (A23) equates the marginal utility of consumption to its marginal cost (or the forgone 
benefit of an additional unit of consumption in the next period). This equation implies that the 
tax rate has a negative relationship with the utility of consumption and thus, the tax rate 
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increases when the marginal value of consumption is lower12. Since welfare is a function of 
consumption, this implies that the flexibility of the variable tax system has a great advantage 
in ensuring the maximum of social welfare can be achieved even when other economic and 
environmental variables change.  
Equations (A22) to (A25) plus equations (A5) to (A9), (A11), (A12), and (A16) to (A19) 
represent the economy in a variable tax regime.  
Appendix 2: Calibration 
To calibrate the macroeconomic relationship, we use the Australian RBC literature. We use 
Jaaskela and Nimark (2011), Gomez-Gonzalez and Rees (2013) and Rees (2013) and set each 
period of time equal to a quarter of a year and calibrate the discount factor, β, to 0.99. The 









t  where ζ represents the constant coefficient of 
relative risk aversion and is set to 1.66 based on Hodge et al. (2008). The capital depreciate 
rate, δ, is set equal to 0.02 (Rees, 2013).  
Our calibration approach deviates from Heutel (2012) in calibrating emissions from the rest of 
the world rowtm . Calibrating his research to the US economy, Heutel (2012) assumes that 
emissions from the rest of the world are 3 times greater than the domestic emissions produced 
by the US. However, tying rowtm  to domestic emissions at a constant rate under emissions 
pricing policies would not be appropriate since it provides a channel to transfer the effects of 
domestic emissions reduction policies to the rest of the world emissions. In other words, if a 
policy affects mt its effect would be transferred to rowtm , which is not necessarily true. To avoid 
this we calculate rowtm  under the BAU scenario and keep it constant under different emissions 
                                                 
12 As the low of diminishing marginal utility u”(ct) is negative.  
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pricing policies. We use the Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Centre data over 1950-2010 
(CDIAC, 2013) to find global and Australian carbon dioxide emissions. The data reveals that 
the rest of the world emissions are about 30 times greater than Australia’s emissions. Therefore, 
the rest of the world emissions under a BAU scenario is mϑ  where ϑ is set equal to 30. 
To calibrate g(μt) we use the RICE model. In one of the latest model, RICE (2010), Australia 
is categorised into the Other High Income (OHI) group countries. Therefore, we use the 
parameters of the OHI group. Nordhaus (2010) specifies the abatement cost function g(μt) as 
( ) 2t1tg θµθµ = where θ2 = 2.8. θ1 is a function of time with an initial value of 0.07 for the OHI 
countries which decreases by 5% each decade to be 0.029 in 50 years. Such little change in θ1 
enables us to assume that it is constant at its initial value since incorporating changes in 
backstop technologies is not the aim of this paper13. 
In calibrating the persistence of pollution in the atmosphere, η, we use the Reilly and Anderson 
(1992) estimation of the half-life of atmospheric carbon dioxide which is 83 years, equivalent 
to 0.9979 quarterly. We specify the relationship between output and emissions as ( ) γ−= 1tt yyh
. The coefficient of output over emissions, 1-γ, is not available in the literature and we estimate 
it using seasonally adjusted quarterly data from the Australian National Accounts (Australian 
Bureau of Statistics, 2014) and Australia’s National Greenhouse Accounts (Department of the 
Environment, 2014) for September 2001-December 2013. We estimate 1-γ as the regression 
coefficient of the log of emissions on the log of output which equals 0.097514.  
The damage caused by pollution d(xt) is set to be a linear quadratic function: 
( ) 2t2t10t xdxddxd ++= . This function is calibrated using the DICE and RICE models and 
                                                 
13 This includes the recent changes in Australia’s electricity sector as many of Australia’s coal-fired electricity 
generators are old and slowly closing which affect emissions production and abatement costs of this sector. 
14 The regression results can be provided upon request. 
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results in15 -8-6 101.2261 and 105.6629 0.0011, ×=×−=−= 010 ddd . The production function 
is calibrated to ( ) αkkf = where k is capital and 10 <<α  shows the output elasticity of capital. 
Calibrating to Rees (2013) and Gomez-Gonzalez and Rees (2013) α equals 0.33. Finally, we 
use Rees (2013) to calibrate the persistence of TFP shocks, ρ , to be 0.98 while the shock 
variable tε  is normally distributed with a mean of 0 and standard deviation, σ, of 0.0069. We 
substitute these equations and parameters into the model described in Section 2 to obtain the 
numerical results for Australia in the next section. Table A1 summarises all the parameters 
explained above. 
Appendix 3: Solution Matrix 
We parameterised and log-linearised the model presented in Appendices 1 and 2. The solution 
is obtained as below: 
Fixed Tax: 
tttt xkk ε ′+′′=′ −−  0.054586 0.00933- 0.975687 11  
tttt xkc ε ′+′′=′ −−  0.489166 0.17323- 0.483139 11  
tttt xk εµ ′′+′=′ −−  0.49136-0.119047-0.16546 11  
Variable Tax: 
tttt xkk ε ′+′+′=′ −−  0.054635 -0.00938 0.975709 11  
tttt xkc ε ′+′+′=′ −−  0.488067 -0.17245 0.482881 11  
tttt xk εµ ′′+′=′ −−  0.14799- 0.657158 0.192925 11  
                                                 
15 The details of damage function calibration can be provided upon request.  
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Where v′ shows the deviation from steady state of v. These equations show the relationship 
between the state variables (i.e. k, x and ε) and the control variables of investment, consumption 
and abatement. These equations present the laws of motion and are used to graphically show 
the responses of the economy to the productivity shocks.  
Table 1: Theoretical Moments 
 
Fixed Tax Variable Tax 
va E(v) σ(v)  σ(v)/σ(y)  E(v) σ(v)  σ(v)/σ(y) 
y 0.3450 0.1484 1 0.3447 0.1485 1 
c 0.1722 0.1235 0.8321 0.1716 0.1234 0.8313 
k 0.0192 0.1686 1.1362 0.0189 0.1689 1.1376 
µ -0.1730 0.0744 0.5014 -0.0517 0.0252 0.1694 
m 0.0452 0.0195 0.1311 0.0371 0.0137 0.0921 
z -0.1393 0.0600 0.4039 0.1999 0.1949 1.3129 
p - - - 0.2180 0.1624 1.0940 














Table A1: Summary of model parameters 
Parameter Value Description Source 
α 0.33 Output elasticity of capital Rees (2013), Gomez-Gonzalez and 
Rees (2013) 
ζ 1.66 Risk aversion coefficient Hodge et al. (2008) 
β 0.99 Discount factor Jaaskela and Nimark (2011), 
Gomez-Gonzalez and Rees (2013), 
Rees (2013) 
δ 0.02 Capital depreciation rate Rees (2013) 
ρ 0.98 Autocorrelation parameter 
of the productivity shock 
Rees (2013) 
σ 0.007 Standard deviation of tε  Rees (2013) 
η 0.9979 Autocorrelation parameter 
of pollution 
Heutel (2012) 
d0 -0.0011 Intercept of damage function  Estimated by the author for Australia 
from Nordhaus (2010) model 
d1 -5.6629e-
10 
Linear coefficient of the 
damage function  
Estimated by the author for Australia 
from Nordhaus (2010) model 
d2 1.2261e-8 Quadratic coefficient of the 
damage function 
Estimated by the author for Australia 
from Nordhaus (2010) model 
θ1 0.07 Abatement cost function 
coefficient 
Nordhaus (2010) 
θ2 2.8 Abatement cost function 
exponential coefficient 
Nordhaus (2010) 
1-γ 0.0975 Emissions elasticity of 
output 
Estimated by the author from the 
Australian emissions and GDP data 






























Figure 2 Impulse responses of economic variables to a TFP shock under a fixed 


























































































































Figure 3 Impulse responses of environmental variables to a TFP shock under a fixed 













































































































































Figure 4 Business cycle simulation of output under business-as-usual (BAU), fixed 
emissions tax (FixedTax) and variable emissions tax (VarTax) scenarios when levels are 
normalised by the BAU steady state level of output 
 
 
Figure 5 Cyclical simulation results of emissions under business-as-usual (BAU), fixed 
emissions tax (FixedTax) and variable emissions tax (VarTax) scenarios 
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